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Abstract
We study the indeterminacy of equilibrium in the Fujita-Krugman (1995)
model of city formation under monopolistic competition and increasing returns.
Both the number and the locations of cities are endogenously determined. As-
suming smooth transportation costs, we examine equilibria in city-economies
where a ￿nite number of cities form endogenously. For any positive integer K,
the set of equilibria with K distinct cities has a smooth manifold of dimension
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1K ￿1 as its interior for almost all parameter values in a regular parameteriza-
tion. The disjoint union of these sets over all positive integers K constitutes
the entire equilibrium set.
Keywords: city formation, smooth economies, increasing returns, indetermi-
nacy of city systems.
JEL classi￿cations: D51, F12, O18, R12, R14.
1. INTRODUCTION
￿Why do cities emerge?￿This has been one of the central questions in urban eco-
nomics. Tracing back to the nineteenth century, von Th￿nen describes a central
township on an agricultural plain as the following. The town is where all manufac-
tured goods are produced; it supplies its production to and imports agricultural goods
from the surrounding rural area (Wartenberg 1966). This points to the concentration
of manufacturing ￿rms in cities.
The phenomenon of production concentration cannot be explained in the classical
general equilibrium framework. Starrett￿ s (1978) Spatial Impossibility Theorem says
that if the space is homogeneous, transport is costly, preferences and production tech-
nologies are independent of location, and there is a competitive market for each good
in every location, then there is no equilibrium involving transportation in a closed
economy (see also Fujita and Thisse 2002). That is, in a competitive equilibrium, pro-
duction activities spread out over space. Cities cannot be equilibrium outcomes unless
one or more of these classical assumptions are dropped. Many authors explain why
￿rms concentrate at a location with imperfect competition.1 Cities emerge because
the production of ￿rms exhibits increasing returns to scale and, hence, they engage in
monopolistic competition. Abdel-Rahman (1988), Abdel-Rahman and Fujita (1990),
and Krugman (1991, 1993a,b) introduce the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) model of monop-
olistic competition and increasing returns into spatial economics. This approach is
known as the ￿New Economic Geography.￿Fujita and Krugman (1995) use it to study
the emergence of a monocentric city on a line. They ￿nd the parameter range within
which a monocentric equilibrium exists and examine the comparative statics. Fujita
and Mori (1997) investigate how a monocentric city evolves into multicity systems as
population increases.
1Another prominent factor is technological externalities, which is another source of market im-
perfection (for example, Henderson 1974).
2This framework successfully provides the necessary ingredients to explain the for-
mation of cities. There are two types of pecuniary externalities that generate the
agglomerative forces sustaining a city, resulting in positive feedback that comes from
￿rms locating near each other. First, manufacturing production will concentrate
where there is a large market, and the market is large where there are many workers
that consume manufactured goods. Second, workers will move to where production
concentrates because the manufactured goods are cheaper there. In spite of success
in providing insights into the agglomerative mechanisms of monopolistic competition
and increasing returns, the model is far from fully explored. Although only equilibria
with cities, where a positive measure of ￿rms locate2, have been examined, there may
exist equilibria where densities of ￿rms distribute over pieces of land. For example,
equilibria may involve no cities (￿rms spread out as density distributions) or a mixture
of both cities and density distributions of ￿rms. These equilibria are di¢ cult to de￿ne
and analyze. In line with previous work, we focus attention on equilibria with cities
only. The problem of multiple equilibria, however, remains. The model lacks deter-
minacy and it is di¢ cult to characterize the equilibrium set. Consequently, previous
work resorts to studying special cases of equilibrium. Examples of a monocentric city,
systems of duocentric and tricentric cities, the symmetric formation of odd numbers
of cities, and even a one-dimensional continuum of equilibria are found in the liter-
ature. They are derived under the assumptions of a ￿xed number of cities or ￿xed
locations of cities or both. These illustrative examples are insightful and suggestive;
nevertheless, a broader picture of the equilibrium set is still absent. What kind of
object is it? How many dimensions does it have? The determination of dimension
is important since it reveals the degree of indeterminacy in the model, the number
of free variables for computational work, and the validity of comparative statics. Of
particular importance is the question of local uniqueness of equilibrium, a necessary
condition for (di⁄erential) comparative statics. This paper attempts to answer these
questions in a general framework where both the number and locations of cities are
endogenously determined.
We adopt the di⁄erentiable approach introduced into economics by Debreu (1970,
1976) and Smale (1973, 1974), and summarized by Dierker (1974) and Mas-Colell
(1985). In this approach, the equilibria of an economy are de￿ned as solutions to a
system of smooth (Cr, r > 0) equations. The system is regularly parameterized3 in a
2More precisely, a city is an atom in the distribution of ￿rms.
3A parameter space is ￿regular￿ if the system￿ s Jacobian matrix with respect to endogenous
3￿nite dimensional Euclidean space. The generic dimension of the solution manifold
is then determined by the numbers of equations and endogenous variables. We can
then conclude that for almost all economies, the equilibrium set is a smooth manifold4
of known dimension. Berliant and Zenou (2002) is a recent application in urban
economics. It studies the generic dimension of the equilibrium set in a city formation
model with labor di⁄erentiation.
Our technique di⁄ers from the established smooth economy literature in that our
equilibrium is de￿ned by a system of equations and inequalities. The presence of
inequalities causes di¢ culties. Consequently, we construct an ￿extended regular pa-
rameterization￿and obtain a weaker result. Our main theorem is the following. For
any positive integer K, the set of equilibria with K distinct cities has a smooth
(boundariless) manifold of dimension K ￿ 1 as its interior for almost all parameter
values. This result shows a great deal of indeterminacy in the model;5 the equilib-
rium set with a given number of cities is generically a continuum of high dimension.
Moreover, the equilibrium set of a typical economy is the disjoint union of equilib-
rium sets with any number of cities. This problem of indeterminacy results from the
lack of equilibrium conditions: there are not enough equations to pin down every
variable. In this general equilibrium framework where all agents choose locations si-
multaneously, the market does not provide equilibrium conditions that determine the
linkage among city locations. There is a growing literature on indeterminacy discov-
ered in economic models recently: for example, ￿nancial markets, endogenous growth
models, and games. Our work adds to this literature by showing real indeterminacy
variables and parameters has full rank at every equilibrium for all parameter values (Mas-Colell
1985).
4A smooth manifold is a set of which every element has a neighborhood that can be mapped to
a piece of a Euclidean space by a smooth bijection with a smooth inverse. Thus, the set behaves
￿locally￿like a Euclidean space. Formally, M is an n-dimensional Cr-manifold if there is an open
cover fUigi2￿ of M such that for each i 2 ￿, there is a Cr-di⁄eomorphism ’i : Ui ! <n which maps
Ui to an open subset of <n.
5Krugman (1993a) addresses the indeterminacy of the equilibrium location of a single city due
to the neutrality of agents with respect to spatial shifts. His model, however, does not show the
seriousness of this problem. If we replace the unit interval used in his model with a circle of land,
then all equilibria become identical and the indeterminacy is trivial. Even with multiple cities, this
type of indeterminacy is a simple parallel spatial shift of the locations of all agents in all cities. It is
eliminated in Fujita and Krugman (1995) by introducing the use of land and normalizing a location
to the origin. The indeterminacy presented in our paper is not trivial, since one equilibrium cannot
be derived from another through a spatial shift. Moreover, the degree of indeterminacy rises with
the number of cities.
4can also be found in spatial models. Another type of indeterminacy, discovered by
Ellison and Fudenberg (2003), comes from the market impact a ￿rm generates when
it moves into a region or market. This e⁄ect is commonly ignored or assumed to be
zero. Although it renders comparative statics di¢ cult, indeterminacy in itself does
not invalidate a model, as illustrated in the modern literature on general equilibrium
with incomplete asset markets. Our view is that there is a great deal of diversity in
the world, and models with indeterminacies could help explain it.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a generalization of the
standard model of the new economic geography (￿ la Fujita and Krugman 1995,
Fujita and Mori 1997, Fujita, Krugman, and Venables 1999, and Fujita and Thisse
2002) with a richer set of parameters. We study equilibria when the number and
locations of cities are endogenously determined. There is a countable number of
cities, each with a positive measure of ￿rms. Cities import the agricultural good from
a connected piece of land and locate within this land segment. Section 3 presents the
main theorem. Section 4 concludes and contains our conjecture about the source of
indeterminacy in this model as well as a detailed discussion of equilibrium selection
in relation to the work of Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999).
2. THE MODEL
We begin by introducing the benchmark model, which is quite standard in the
literature. We need more parameters to provide a regular parameterization. To fa-
cilitate comparison, these parameters will be added later. The economy has a space
of locations Z = <. Each location r in Z is endowed with one unit density of ho-
mogeneous land. Land is used for agricultural production only. The utilized land is
denoted by B ￿ Z. There are two types of commodities: a homogeneous agricultural
A-good and di⁄erentiated manufactured goods. There is a continuum of manufac-
tured goods of size n 2 <+, which is determined endogenously. Each manufactured
good is denoted by j 2 [0;n]. A-good is produced by farms that employ labor and rent
land, while j-goods are produced by ￿rms that employ labor only. Firms do not use
or occupy land. Let C ￿ Z denote the set of ￿rm locations. The delivered prices of
A-good and j-good at location r 2 Z are denoted by pA (r) and pM (j;r) respectively
where pA : Z ! <++ and pM : [0;n] ￿ Z ! <++ are measurable functions.
Consumers
5There is a continuum of identical mobile workers of Lebesgue measure N 2 <++
who receive wages for their labor. Each worker is endowed with one unit of labor.
They can work for the agricultural or the manufacturing sector. Each worker supplies
labor and consumes goods at a chosen location. There is a continuum of immobile
landlords distributed uniformly over Z with density one. Each landlord owns one
unit density of land where she lives. Landlords receive rent if their land is utilized.
Consumers are denoted by i 2 fW;Lg; workers are denoted by W and landlords by
L. The wage and land rent at location r are denoted by w(r) and R(r) respectively,
where w : Z ! < and R : Z ! < are measurable functions.
Let Ai and mi (j) be, respectively, the quantities of A-good and j-good consumed
by consumer i where Ai 2 <+ and mi : [0;n] ! <+ is measurable. All workers and

















￿, 0 < ￿;￿ < 1. They enjoy no utility from leisure. Given
prices pA and pM, a consumer who lives at location r with income Y (wage or rent)




s:t: pA (r)Ai +
R n
0 pM (j;r)mi (j)dj = Y:
(1)
This optimization problem yields the following demand functions.
^ Ai (r) = (1 ￿ ￿)Y=pA (r);












is the manufacturing price index.
Substituting Y with w(r) and R(r) respectively in these functions, we get the
worker￿ s demand, ^ AW (r) and ^ mW (j;r), and the landlord￿ s demand, ^ AL (r) and
^ mL (j;r). A worker￿ s indirect utility at r is
v (r) = ￿





Workers are freely mobile. They choose locations that o⁄er the highest utility level.
Landlords at locations with negative rent will not rent out their land. To simplify
the analysis, we assume they will rent it out when the rent is zero. Thus,
r 2 B if and only if R(r) ￿ 0: (2)
6All landlords in ZnB receive zero income; they do not consume anything.
Firms
Firms produce di⁄erentiated products. Labor is the only input required. All ￿rms






LM units of labor are required for qM units of output, where F M 2 <++ and cM 2
<++ are the ￿xed and the marginal input requirements respectively. The production
technology exhibits increasing returns to scale due to the ￿xed cost. There is free
entry into the market. Because of increasing returns to scale, each j-good is produced
by and is the only product of an operating ￿rm. Operating ￿rms choose locations
and engage in Chamberlinian monopolistic competition. Each ￿rm chooses a location
and charges a uniform free on board (f.o.b.) price for its product. Firms make




, where qM : <+ ￿ Z ! < is the consumers￿demand and is known






























Because of the assumed constant elasticity utility function and the iceberg trans-
portation cost, which will be introduced later, the elasticity of demand facing a ￿rm
is independent of the locations of its consumers. (This is widely known; see Fujita
and Krugman 1995, and Fujita, Krugman and Venables 1999.) A monopolistically
competitive ￿rm charges a price marked up from the marginal cost. The optimal














Note that the total number of operating ￿rms, which is the same as the total variety
of products, is determined endogenously.
Farms
The agricultural good is produced by perfectly competitive farms with a constant
input-output ratio. There is free entry into the market. One unit of A-good requires
7one unit of land and cA 2 <++ units of labor. Each of a unit density of operating
farms has the capacity to produce one unit density of A-good. Each farm at location
r pays wage w(r) to the workers and rent R(r) to the landlord. Its pro￿t is
￿
A (r) = p
A (r) ￿ c
Aw(r) ￿ R(r):
Transportation
Transportation costs take the Samuelson iceberg form. If one unit of A-good
(respectively j-good) is shipped from location s to location r, then tA (s;r)
￿1 (respec-
tively tM (s;r)
￿1) units arrive. The function t￿, ￿ 2 fA;Mg, satis￿es the following
assumptions for all s;r 2 Z: (i) t￿ is C1.6 (ii) t￿ (s;r) ￿ 1, t￿ (s;s) = 1, and
limjs￿rj!1 t￿ (s;r) = 1, and (iii) (s ￿ r) @
@st￿ (s;r) > 0, (s ￿ r) @
@rt￿ (s;r) < 0. As-
sumption (ii) says that there is a positive cost when a good is transported to another
location and no cost if it is transported to the same location, and the transport cost
approaches in￿nity if the distance between locations approaches in￿nity. Assumption
(iii) requires the transportation cost to increase as the distance between locations
increases.
The city economy
We restrict attention to economies with a countable number of distinct cities. A
city is de￿ned to be where a positive measure of ￿rms locate7. The number and
locations of cities are endogenous. Suppose there are K (a positive integer) cities.
The set of city locations is denoted by C = fckg
K
k=1 where ck 2 Z for all k 2 f1;:::Kg
and c1 < ::: < cK. The list fNkg
K
k=1, 0 < Nk < N for all k 2 f1;:::Kg, denotes
the worker populations in cities. The real number NA, 0 < NA < N, denotes the
worker population on agricultural land. Since in equilibrium a worker will supply all
of her labor endowment, we set local population equal to labor supply for simplic-
ity. Note that a city accommodates a worker population of a positive measure, while
each rural location hosts one unit density of landlords and cA units density of farm
workers. The list fnkg
K
k=1, where nk 2 <++ for all k 2 f1;:::Kg, denotes the number
6Note that the widely used exponential function t(s;r) = e￿js￿rj is not di⁄erentiable at r = s
since limr!s+
t(s;r)
r￿s = 1 and limr!s￿
t(s;r)
r￿s = ￿1.
7The most general setting is to characterize the distribution of workers and ￿rms with a measure
possessing atoms. Although this generalized setting allows both a countable number of cities and
a continuum of ￿rms spread out over pieces of land of positive measure, the equilibria cannot be
reduced to the solutions to a system of a ￿nite number of equations with a ￿nite number of unknowns.
8of ￿rms locating in cities. Thus the total number of ￿rms (and the total variety of
manufactured goods) is n =
PK
k=1 nk. Since consumers (respectively ￿rms) are iden-
tical and their equilibrium behavior di⁄ers only with location, we relabel them with
their locations. Firms and manufactured goods are labeled by their cities. Thus, we
replace pM (j;r) with pM (ck;r) and mi (j) with mi (ck) for all j-goods manufactured






















. Let Ai (r), where i 2 fW;Lg and Ai : Z ! <+
is a measurable function, denote the consumption of A-good of a consumer at r. Let
mi (ck;r), where i 2 fW;Lg and mi : C ￿ Z ! <+ is a measurable function, denote
the consumption of goods manufactured in city ck of a consumer at r. The number
qM
k 2 <++ denotes the output of ￿rms in city ck.
To simplify the analysis, we prohibit A-good resale. Note that in equilibrium,
each rural location (in BnC) has a surplus of A-good: the total local consumption
is (1 ￿ ￿)cAw(r)=pA (r) + (1 ￿ ￿)cA ￿
pA (r) ￿ cAw(r)
￿
=pA (r) = (1 ￿ ￿) while the
total local production is 1. Thus, every rural location exports A-good to cities and
only cities import A-good. We further restrict allocations to satisfy the following
conditions. (i) The utilized land B is a closed, connected interval. Then,
R
B cAdr ￿ N
implies B has a ￿nite length. We normalize the utilized land B = [0;￿]. (ii) Cities
locate inside the utilized land. (iii) Moreover, each city imports A-good from an
interval of agricultural land8 exclusive of other cities. These conditions are formally
speci￿ed as follows.
Condition ￿.
(i) B = [0;￿].
(ii) C ￿ (0;￿).
(iii) There are K disjoint intervals Ik = [bk￿1;bk) for k 2 f1;:::;K ￿ 1g and IK =
[bK￿1;bK], where b0 = 0, bK = ￿ and bk￿1 < bk, such that city ck imports A-good
from and only from Ik.
These restrictions are needed, for otherwise the equilibrium pattern of land use
is indeterminate. In theory, B can be a collection of isolated pieces of land, and
each city may import A-good from disconnected land pieces. With the exponential
8This assumption is in accord with Fujita and Mori (1997), Appendix A.
9transportation cost function t(s;r) = ejs￿rj, (i) and (iii) can actually be derived
in equilibrium from transportation cost minimization and a ￿no cheaper A-supply￿
condition, which means a city cannot ￿nd a location that can supply A-good cheaper
than from where it imports. To study the equilibrium patterns of land use in general,
however, involves a great number of endogenous variables describing the lengths and
locations of all agricultural areas. This seems to be intractable.
The extended model
We add the following parameters to the benchmark model. These parameters
constitute a regular parameter space so that the dimension of the equilibrium set can
be examined. There are di⁄erent ways to extend the benchmark model to a regular
parameterization and these parameters are just an example. In the extended model,
the urban wage at ck may di⁄er from agricultural wage w(ck) at the same location.
This is because cities do not occupy land, and the density of land at ck is employed
for agricultural production. Let wk denote urban wages at ck; w(r) is reserved for
agricultural wage.
(i) City-speci￿c ￿xed input, ￿ 2 <K
++. There are di⁄erences among cities that
a⁄ect a ￿rm￿ s production function. They can be city speci￿c transaction costs or the
costs to use cities￿infrastructure. For each ￿rm in city ck, the ￿xed labor input is
F M + ￿k. This creates di⁄erences among ￿rms in di⁄erent cities. Hence, there is a
separate pro￿t function for ￿rms in each city. With output qM, the pro￿t of a ￿rm


















(ii) Immobile worker population, l 2 <
K￿1
++ . There are two types of labor: immo-
bile workers of size
PK￿1
k=1 lk and mobile workers of size N ￿
PK￿1
k=1 lk. lk denotes the
population of immobile workers in city ck for k 2 f1;:::;K ￿ 1g. The total worker
population of city ck is Nk + lk for k 2 f1;:::;K ￿ 1g. (For convenience, we de￿ne
lK = 0 in summations of city populations. We could add the parameter lK to the
model, but it is not needed to generate a regular parameterization.)
(iii) Urban amenity factor, ￿ 2 <K
++. Workers have preferences over either the
natural advantages of a location (e.g. weather) or over some ￿xed man-made amenities
(e.g. the symphony). If a worker lives in the rural area, her utility function is the
same as the benchmark case. If she lives in city ck, her utility level is factored up








that ￿ does not a⁄ect consumers￿demand; it plays a role in their location choices












For simplicity, we assume the workers employed by a type ck ￿rm face the same urban
amenity factor ￿k at a rural location (this prevents a ￿rm from locating slightly away
from the city and pro￿ting from a discontinuous wage drop).
(iv) Land development cost, ￿1;￿2 2 <++. It takes a development cost to utilize
the boundary and the idle land (e.g. putting up fences). Landlords in (￿1;0] pay a
￿xed cost ￿1 to utilize their land, and landlords in [￿;1) pay a ￿xed cost ￿2 to utilize
theirs. The development cost is deducted from landlords￿rent income. So, the net
income of a landlord at r is R(r) ￿ ￿1 for r 2 (￿1;0] and R(r) ￿ ￿2 for r 2 [￿;1).
(v) Moving cost, e 2 <K
++. If a ￿rm is to move from city ck to r 2 Zn [K
h=1 fchg,
then ek units of labor at the new location is required for relocation. Note that e does
not a⁄ect ￿rms￿production decisions; it plays a role only when a ￿rm is considering
relocation. In addition, we assume that the production function of a relocating ￿rm
does not change. With output qM, the potential pro￿t of a ￿rm in city ck relocating



















(vi) Farm tax, ￿ 2 <++ and ￿1;￿2 ￿ ￿. A uniform tax ￿ is levied on all operating
farms in (0;￿). The tax revenue is then transferred to the landlords at the correspond-
ing locations. So, the after-tax farm pro￿t is ^ ￿
A (r) = pA (r) ￿ cAw(r) ￿ ￿ ￿ R(r),
while the landlord receives rent ￿ R(r) = R(r) ￿ ￿ plus the transfer.
Notice that if parameters of this extended model are chosen appropriately, the
benchmark model is a special case. Let ￿ ￿ <
4K+2
++ be a bounded, open parameter




represents a K-city economy. The benchmark model is parameterized at ￿k = 0,




































lk + NA = N: (4)
11PK





mW (ch;r)cA + mL (ch;r)
￿
tM (ch;r)dr ￿ qM





1 ￿ cAAW (r) ￿ AL (r)
￿
tA (r;ck)
￿1 dr = AW (ck)Nk,
for all k 2 f1;:::;Kg where b0 = 0, bK = ￿:
(6)
Equation (4) balances the total demand for workers and total worker population.
Equation (5) balances the demand for each manufactured good and its supply. Equa-
tion (6) balances A-good exports and surplus at each rural location and balances each






k=1, pA (r), w(r), fwkg
K
k=1, and R(r), the following con-
ditions are satis￿ed in equilibrium:
Workers are freely mobile and identical, so their utility levels are the same wherever
they locate.
v (r) = v (0) for all r 2 [0;￿];
vM
k (ck) = v (0) for k 2 f1;:::;Kg:
(7)
Because of free entry, if there are positive pro￿ts, new ￿rms enter the market until
the pro￿ts are brought down to zero. Thus, operating ￿rms earn zero pro￿ts.
^ ￿
M
k (ck) = 0 for all k 2 f1;:::;Kg: (8)
The location choices of ￿rms constitute a Nash equilibrium. Together with free




k (r) ￿ 0 for all r 2 ZnC: (9)
Free entry will drive farms￿pro￿ts to zero at any operating location.
^ ￿
A (r) = 0 for all r 2 [0;￿]: (10)
There is no arbitrage in the transportation sector. The transportation costs fully
account for the price di⁄erences of a good at di⁄erent locations. The transportation
of a manufactured good is always from the producing ￿rm￿ s location (this is the only
12location that can export) to a buyer￿ s location. The following condition determines
the price of manufactured goods at di⁄erent locations.
p
M (ck;r) = ^ p
M (ck)t
M (ck;r) for all k 2 f1;:::;Kg;r 2 Z: (11)
The transportation of agricultural good is determined by a list of city locations and
A-supply intervals. Then, the price of the agricultural good at every location is
determined by the no arbitrage condition. This is discussed in detail in Appendix A.
An equilibrium is a list of prices and a feasible allocation such that conditions (1),
(2), (3), and (7) to (11) are satis￿ed.
The next lemma shows that in equilibrium, landlord income is zero at the two
edges of the utilized land, and that the potential landlord income is negative on idle
land.
Lemma 1. In equilibrium,
R(0) ￿ ￿1 = R(￿) ￿ ￿2 = 0; (12)
and R(r) ￿ ￿1 < 0 for r 2 (￿1;0), R(r) ￿ ￿2 < 0 for r 2 (￿;1).
Proof : See Appendix C.
Thus, we replace the landlords￿optimization condition (2) with (12) plus
R(r) ￿ ￿ ￿ 0 for all r 2 (0;￿): (13)
We examine equilibria with K distinct cities. The equilibrium set of a general city-
economy is the disjoint union of K-equilibrium sets for all positive integers K. Before
proceeding to the formal de￿nition, we need to make some modi￿cations. First, the
prices belong to an in￿nite dimensional space. In order to determine the dimension
of the equilibrium set, we ￿t the system into a ￿nite dimensional Euclidean space by
eliminating variables. Second, the price of A-good is not smooth. We approximate it
with a smooth function in Appendix B.





























and ￿ Q(r) are de￿ned
in Appendix B.)
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1 ￿ cAAW (r) ￿ AL (r)
￿
tA (r;ck)
￿1 dr ￿ AW (ck)(Nk + lk) = 0,


















￿￿ = 0 for k 2 f1;:::;Kg: (16)
1 ￿ c
Aw0 ￿ ￿1 = 0: (17)
p





￿ ￿ ￿2 = 0: (18)
c1 < ::: < cK < ￿; N ￿
K X
k=1
Nk > 0; b1 < ::: < bK￿1 < ￿: (19)
￿ Q
k (r) ￿ 0 for all r 2 (￿￿ z; ￿ z)n [
K
h=1 fchg for all k 2 f1;:::;Kg: (20)
￿ R(r) ￿ 0 for all r 2 (0;￿): (21)
Equations in (14) and (15) are linearly dependent because of Walras￿law as pre-
sented in the next lemma. Label the lefthand side functions in (14) f1;:::;fK and
those in (15) fK+1;:::;f2K.








A (ck)fk+K = 0:
Proof. See Appendix C.
3. THE GENERIC DIMENSION OF THE EQUILIBRIUM SET
14To determine the dimension of the equilibrium set de￿ned by smooth equations,
we need a regular parameterization where the system￿ s Jacobian matrix with respect
to endogenous variables and parameters has full rank at every equilibrium for all
parameter values. Then, by the Transversality Theorem, the Jacobian matrix with
respect to endogenous variables has full rank at every equilibrium for almost all
parameter values. When it has full rank, the Implicit Function Theorem implies
that the equilibrium set is a smooth manifold of dimension equal to the number of
endogenous variables minus the number of equations. There are complications when
applying these results to urban models. First, it is di¢ cult to check regularity in the
benchmark model. This is the reason why we add more parameters. Second, our
system contains inequality constraints. Strict inequalities do not cause a problem.
The presence of weak inequalities, however, changes the topological properties of
the equilibrium set. To resolve this, we include weak inequalities as equalities and
parameterize the augmented system of equations. We deal with ￿, a bounded open
subset of the parameters. The results hold for the whole parameter space, that






Theorem 1. For a regular parameterization ￿, the set of K-equilibria for an
economy has a C1-manifold of dimension K ￿1 as its interior for almost all ￿ 2 ￿.9
Proof. See Appendix C.
This raises the issue of indeterminacy: for a given number of cities, the equilibrium
set is generically a continuum of rather high dimension. The equilibrium set of a
general city economy is the disjoint union of K-equilibrium sets for all integers K.
Existence of city equilibria is demonstrated in the literature for a wide range of
parameters by solving out for them explicitly. Our result shows that there are many
equilibria. To understand how far the equilibrium set extends beyond the manifold,
we further investigate it in Appendix D and show that for almost all ￿ 2 ￿, the
set of K-equilibria for an economy is approximately10 contained in the closure of its
9We use the following phrases interchangeably: ￿for almost all ￿ 2 ￿,￿and ￿except for ￿ in a set
of Lebesgue measure zero in ￿.￿
10We use the following notion of approximation. Let fi : X ! <n and ^ fi :
X ! <n be families of continuous maps, where i 2 I1 [ I2 [ I3 and I1;I2;I3 are
￿nite. If sets A = fxjfi (x) = 0;8i 2 I1; fi (x) > 0;8i 2 I2;fi (x) ￿ 0;8i 2 I3g and B =
15interior.
The formation of symmetric cities draws much attention in the literature. By
symmetry, we mean that there is a geographic center at ￿=2 and any parameters and
endogenous variables on one side of the center has a mirror image on the other side.
Symmetry reduces the di⁄erence between the numbers of endogenous variables and
equations; this renders equilibrium sets of lower dimension.
Corollary 1. When K is even (respectively odd), the set of symmetric K-
equilibria has a C1-manifold of dimension K=2 (respectively (K ￿ 1)=2) as its inte-
rior for almost all parameter values in a regular parameterization.
Proof. See Appendix C.
When K = 2 or 3, the set of symmetric K-equilibria is generically one-dimensional.
This is con￿rmed in Fujita and Mori (1997, Appendix F), where one-dimensional
continua of equilibria are computed in cases of symmetric equilibrium with two and
three cities. When K = 1, the equilibrium set is of dimension zero, which is the union
of isolated points. Fujita and Krugman (1995) study symmetric equilibria with one
city in the benchmark model and ￿nd a unique equilibrium, consistent with Corollary
1. We show, in the following example, that there is no asymmetric equilibrium with
one city in the benchmark model. Therefore, the symmetric monocentric equilibrium
is the unique equilibrium in this case, consistent with Theorem 1.
Example. Consider a city in the middle of linear agricultural land. The land
stretches on both sides of the city. The transportation costs have the following form:
t￿ (s;r) = ￿ t￿ (js ￿ rj). The functions ￿ t￿ are determined by distance only, not by
location.
Let [0;￿] denote the utilized agricultural land. Suppose there is an asymmetric
equilibrium with the city at location c, 0 < c < ￿, c 6= ￿=2. Without loss of
generality, suppose the city is closer to ￿ and the mirror image of ￿ to c is ￿ (=
2c ￿ ￿). Then pA (0) < pA (￿) = pA (￿), pM (c;0) > pM (c;￿) = pM (c;￿), and
G(0) > G(￿) = G(￿). Note that ￿ t￿ (jc ￿ ￿j) = ￿ t￿ (jc ￿ ￿j). By R(0) = 0 = R(￿),
n
xj ^ fi (x) = 0;8i 2 I1; ^ fi (x) > 0;8i 2 I2; ^ fi (x) ￿ 0;8i 2 I3
o
, then B approximates A if ^ fi approxi-
mates fi in the C0-Whitney topology for all i 2 I1 [ I2 [ I3.
16we have w(0) = pA (0)=cA, w(￿) = pA (￿)=cA. Thus,
v (0) =









￿ = v (￿):
which violates (7).
4. CONCLUSION
This paper takes a step further towards characterizing the equilibrium set with
cities: its generic dimension is determined. The result reveals a great deal of in-
determinacy in the model. The equilibrium set is generically the disjoint union of
sets of arbitrarily high dimension. This restricts the model￿ s predictive power, and
di⁄erential comparative statics analysis is not valid.
There are at least three causes of indeterminacy in economic models. The ￿rst
type is discussed in footnote 5 and is rather trivial; it involves parallel spatial shifts
of variables and can be eliminated by normalization of the location of one city. The
second type involves models whose parameterizations are not regular. Such examples
can be found in game theory. Finally, there is indeterminacy even when one has
a regular parameterization, caused by more unknowns than equations. This is the
third type and where our work lies. In standard models with complete markets, the
numbers of endogenous variables and equations are equal. In our model, as in models
with incomplete asset markets, this is not true. There are not enough equations
to pin down every variable. More precisely, there are four endogenous variables for
each city (k = 1;:::;K): location, population, wage, and A-good supply interval, but
only three equations: market clearance of city exports (manufactured goods), equal
utility of workers, and market clearance of city imports (agricultural good). The use
of agricultural land brings one extra condition independent of the number of cities
and this is why the equilibrium set does not contain a K-dimensional continuum, but
rather a K ￿ 1 dimensional manifold. As we will discuss below, this can be viewed
as an indeterminacy in the locations of K ￿1 cities relative to the location of a given
city whose location has been normalized.
It is natural to think of ￿remedies￿for indeterminacy11 that add more markets
into the model; for example, we can add land markets in cities if ￿rms employ land as
11We wish to remind the reader that as argued in the introduction, we do not think that indeter-
minacy in a model is necessarily undesirable.
17an input. Such modi￿cations, however, will not reduce indeterminacy since they add
the same number of equations (market clearing conditions) and endogenous variables
(prices).12 Indeterminacy is persistent in competitive spatial economies as in other
areas of economics. In many cases, we know that the most basic and commonly used
model su⁄ers from indeterminacy. The question of how model speci￿cation a⁄ects
indeterminacy warrants further research: What general features of a model generate
indeterminacy? How does the way in which ￿rms compete, whether perfectly or not,
a⁄ect it? How do other agglomerative factors, such as natural advantages, public
goods, and production externalities, a⁄ect it?
Where does our indeterminacy come from? In games where an agent￿ s strategy
impacts their utility, the optimization conditions of an agent usually pin down their
choice of strategy (given that we have a smooth system with a regular parameteri-
zation), so the number of endogenous variables is equal to the number of ￿rst order
conditions. This is not true in the New Economic Geography. One agent￿ s choice
of strategy will have a negligible impact on the aggregates in a competitive econ-
omy. If there are not enough markets to pin down these aggregate variables, there is
indeterminacy.
In our context, the New Economic Geography, these variables are the relative
distances between the locations of cities. Due to the trivial indeterminacy caused by
parallel spatial shifts, we can normalize the location of one city. This leaves K ￿ 1
variables, the locations of all the other cities, indeterminate, and not choice variables
of any agent.
Determinacy might be obtained by sacri￿cing competitiveness. We need to al-
low some agents to choose the variables in question, but without adding any new
endogenous variables to the system. One way to proceed is to make the number of
￿rms ￿nite. Then when one ￿rm moves away from a location to another, its impact
is non-negligible and it knows this. However, there will be problems with existence
of equilibrium. Firm reaction correspondences might not be convex valued, as they
could take on values at several locations. Land developers and governments can play
roles similar to large ￿rms.
The number of equilibria can be reduced if we restrict attention to equilibria that
are stable with respect to a dynamic adjustment process that describes how equi-
librium is reached. Adjustment dynamics de￿ne a system of equations that yields
12Masahisa Fujita points out that a few models with land in the cities still have a continuum of
equilibria.
18steady states coinciding with the static equilibria. A common example of adjust-
ment dynamics used in urban economics can be found in Fujita and Mori (1997);
Fujita, Krugman and Mori (1999); and Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999), where
population changes are proportional to the di⁄erences between local utility levels and
the average utility level. We conjecture that except for a set of measure zero, our
equilibria are all stable under this stability criterion. The exceptional set consists of
parameters generating equilibria where ￿rms￿potential pro￿t is exactly zero at some
location outside of cities in equilibrium.
The morphogenesis approach developed by Alan Turing is another possible treat-
ment for indeterminacy. The growth of an economy from a near ￿ at distribution of
￿rms is simulated in Krugman (1996) and Fujita, Krugman and Venables (1999). It
generates surprising regularities and seems to be a very natural approach to resolving
indeterminacy. There are evenly spaced clusters of ￿rms, and the number of clus-
ters is a divisor of the number of total sites. Since the distribution is decomposed
into Fourier series and only one dominating frequency survives, the outcome will be
evenly spaced clusters. In a circular land model with a continuum of locations, only
integer frequencies can survive. This restricts cities to be at equally spaced locations
on the circle. In a circular land model with a ￿nite number of potential sites, the
surviving frequency has to divide total number of sites. This means only frequencies
that are factors of the total number of sites can be equilibrium outcomes. There is
a need for less restrictive and less mechanical dynamics that can help us understand
the evolution of cities and how one equilibrium is realized from the continuum of
possibilities.13
Another interesting method for selecting equilibria is proposed by Fujita and Mori
(1997) and Fujita, Krugman and Mori (1999). They simulate the evolution of a city
system as population grows using an approach that emphasizes inertia and continu-
ity. It has the following features: at any time, the system is stable with respect to
migration; new cities appear near the frontier of agricultural land; old cities do not
change locations unless the current locations cannot sustain any ￿rms. The Fujita
and Mori (1997) paper uses the same model as ours, and it is useful to contrast their
results with ours.
13It is conceptually interesting to envision using Turing dynamics to examine stability of an
equilibrium. However, it is apparent that an equilibrium with cities, or spikes in the density of
agents, will remain stable under the kinds of perturbations to which the ￿ at distribution is subjected
in the cited literature.
19Consider all equilibrium sets along the dimension of the population parameter.
Our result characterizes a slice at a particular population value to be the union
of, roughly speaking, manifolds (their precise structure is found in our Theorems
1 and 2). Manifolds of equilibria with the same number of cities are connected
along the population dimension. The economic model itself yields no clear conclusion
on which equilibrium will materialize for a given parameter value. Starting with a
small population, Fujita and Mori (1997) select the symmetric monocentric city; it is
always an equilibrium when the population is small. There are also other equilibria
with di⁄erent numbers of cities and di⁄erent spatial patterns. As we move to larger
population values, the monocentric city equilibrium is selected for every parameter
until it becomes unstable in the sense that a small measure of ￿rms can pro￿t by
moving to either of two frontier critical locations. At this parameter value, Fujita
and Mori (1997) select an equilibrium where there are three stable cities, one each
at the original and the two critical locations. There are other equilibria as well; for
example, new cities can be at a positive distance from the critical locations, the central
city can be at a di⁄erent location, and there can be more than three cities at a stable
equilibrium. This process traces a path inside the connected manifold of equilibria
with one city and then jumps to a path inside the manifold of equilibria with three
cities. The selection continues with cities ￿xed at original locations until old locations
cannot sustain them as cities. Then two more new cities appear at critical locations.
The traced equilibrium path passes through manifolds of one, three, ￿ve, and seven
cities, and so on.
A more elaborate model is presented by Fujita, Krugman and Mori (1999), where
there are three industries with di⁄erent critical distances (the distance between the
central city and the critical locations). Thus, when some ￿rms of an industry move
to frontier critical locations, there are still industries with all ￿rms staying at central
locations. When a frontier city emerges, it can change its location gradually to
maintain stability. This new model generates an urban hierarchy where ￿rms of
an industry with the smallest critical distance appear in all cities, and ￿rms of an
industry with a larger critical distance appear in fewer and bigger cities. Bigger cities
are also farther apart from each other.
Our results are general enough to apply to this hierarchy model as well (our
theorems still work with more industries). The hierarchy generating process is also,
as described above, a selection inside manifolds of equilibria with odd numbers of
cities. At the same time, there are many possible stable equilibria. For example, the
20central industry can split into two cities.
This evolutionary approach displays a very interesting process of birth and death
of cities. The urban hierarchy model captures important aspects of the historical
development of US cities. It is, however, only one of many possible selection processes.
Although the evolutionary approach is very insightful, there is still a need for an
equilibrium selection method that might also satisfy Zipf￿ s law.
APPENDIX A. Determination of the Agricultural Price









. The agricultural price pA (r) is then
determined as follows: pA (r) has peaks at cities and troughs at the end points of
A-supply intervals. When a city ck is inside its A-good supply interval, A-good is
transported to ck from both sides: pA (ck) is at a peak. When a left (respectively
right) end point of an A-supply interval bk is between its city and the next city to the
left (respectively right), A-good is transported away from bk on both sides: pA (bk)
is at the bottom of a trough. Also, b0 and bK are troughs since A-good will not be
transported from outside [0;￿]. To sum up,
ck is a peak if and only if bk￿1 < ck < bk;
bk is a trough if and only if ck < bk < ck+1 or k 2 f0;Kg:
Note that not every city is a peak, and not every end point of an A-supply interval
is a trough. Let fblg
L
l=0 be the set of troughs. Between each pair of adjacent troughs
bl￿1 and bl, there is a peak city cl. The price of A-good at any location between
bl￿1 and bl is determined relative to the peak city price pA (cl) since all A-good is
transported towards cl. More precisely, by no arbitrage,
pA (r) = pA (cl)tA (r;cl)
￿1 for r 2 [bl￿1;bl) for l = f1;:::;Lg;
pA (￿) = pA (cL)tA (￿;cL)
￿1 :
Note that pA has domain Z; yet, the formulae above determine pA (r) only for r 2 B.
To complete the determination of pA over Z, we have to specify the ￿potential prices￿
on the idle land ZnB. There are two potential prices at each location: one for the
farms and one for the ￿rms. First, a potential farm may rent at an idle location in
(￿1;0) and compete with farms at r = 0 by selling to c1, or rent at an idle location
in (￿;1) and compete with farms at r = ￿ by selling to cK. The potential supply
21price determined by no arbitrage is
pA (r) = pA (c1)tA (r;c1)
￿1 for r 2 (￿1;0);
pA (r) = pA (cK)tA (r;cK)
￿1 for r 2 (￿;1):
Second, a ￿rm may choose to locate on the idle land, and the workers￿A-good con-
sumption has to come from one of the edges of B. The potential demand price is
pA;M (r) = pA (0)tA (0;r) for r 2 (￿1;0);
pA;M (r) = pA (￿)tA (￿;r) for r 2 (￿;1):
This price will be used to determine the potential wage at r 2 ZnB.
APPENDIX B. Reduction and Smoothing of the System




















is￿es (1) and (3) to (13). We simplify the system by eliminating variables. This is
possible because of the separability generated by the functional forms we use (also see















c1 < ::: < cK < ￿, N ￿
PK







the rest of the endogenous variables can be determined uniquely as follows. First,




k=1 lk, and by (3), ^ pM (ck) = cMwk=￿ for all
k 2 f1;:::;Kg. Then, by (8), the zero-pro￿t output level is ￿ qM
k = (FM+￿k)￿
cM(1￿￿) and
nk = (Nh + lh)=
￿





FM+￿k for all k 2 f1;:::Kg. The
prices of the manufactured goods are determined by (11):
p
M (ck;r) = t
M (ck;r)c
Mwk=￿ for all k 2 f1;:::;Kg;r 2 Z:





k=1 as in Appendix A. R(r) can be expressed as a function of
pA (r) and w(r) by (10): R(r) = pA (r) ￿ cAw(r) for r 2 (0;￿). Next, fAi (r)gi=W;L
and fmi (ck;r)gi=W;L are determined by (1) as follows.
A
W (r) = ^ A
W (r);A
L (r) = ^ A
L (r);
m
W (ck;r) = ^ m
W (ck;r);m
L (ck;r) = ^ m
L (ck;r):
22The wage function w(r) can be determined by a list of city wages, fwkg
K
k=1, and the
agricultural wage at r = 0, w(0). To simplify notation, let w(0) = w0. Note that




k=1 and hence a function of fwkg
K
k=1. Expand G(r) to


























￿￿ for k 2 f1;:::;Kg: (22)











￿ for all r 2 [0;￿]:
The potential wage for farms at location s outside [0;￿] is determined by the same
























, that satisfy 3K + 2 equations, (5), (6), (12)
and (22), and inequality constraints, c1 < ::: < cK < ￿, N ￿
PK
k=1 Nk > 0, b1 < ::: <
bK￿1 < ￿, (9) and (13). We replace (12) with the following two equations:
1 ￿ c
Aw0 ￿ ￿1 = 0;
p





￿ ￿ ￿2 = 0:
The following lemma shows that ￿rms have negative potential pro￿ts at locations
far enough away from the utilized land [0;￿].
Lemma 3. lims!￿1 ^ ￿
M
k (s) < 0.













F M + ￿k + ek
￿
￿
cM (1 ￿ ￿)
#
23where Qk (s) is the demand for a type ck manufactured good produced at s. Then
^ ￿
M
k (s) ￿ 0, if and only if Qk (s) ￿ ￿ qM
k +
ek￿
cM(1￿￿). Without loss of generality, suppose
s > ￿. Each consumer at location r has demand Qk (s;r) for the ￿rm￿ s product.
Qk (s;r) = ^ m(s;r)tM (s;r) = ￿Y (r)G(r)
￿






























Note that the potential wage wM (s) for s outside [0;￿] is determined by the manu-

























= 1 since lims!1 tM (ck;s) = 1. There-








Consequently, the potential locations for ￿rms can be bounded in (￿￿ z; ￿ z) for a







, we replace condition (9) with
￿ Q
k (r) < 0 for all r 2 (￿￿ z; ￿ z)n [
K
k=1 fckg:









tion cost tA determines a pA function that is not smooth. The following example illus-
trates this problem: Suppose there is a pA trough at location r2 and two peak cities
at r1 and r3 where r1 < r2 < r3. Then pA (r) = pA (r1)
￿
tA (r2;r1)
￿￿1 for r 2 [r1;r2),
and pA (r) = pA (r3)
￿
tA (r2;r3)
￿￿1 for r 2 [r2;r3). Thus, limr!r+
2
d




drpA (r) < 0; pA is not di⁄erentiable at r2.
There are two ways to ￿x this. We can approximate pA (r) by a C1 function. Let
Cr (M;N) denote the set of Cr maps from manifold M to manifold N, and Cr
S (M;N)
denote the strong topology on Cr (M;N) (see Hirsch 1976). The following theorem
shows such an approximation exists.14
14Similar smoothing techniques can be found in, for example, Mas-Colell (1974) and Kehoe (1980).
24(Theorem 2.6, Hirsch 1976, ch.2): Let M and N be Cs manifolds, 1 ￿ s ￿ 1.
Then Cs (M;N) is dense in Cr
S (M;N), 0 ￿ r < s.
Alternatively, we can de￿ne a ￿structure-dependent￿transportation cost function.
More precisely, we do not use a ￿xed transportation cost function but rather assume








. t￿ (s;r) is determined only when
















. Moreover, it needs to result








. The restriction on tA is that it keeps pA (s;r)








changes. At ￿rst glance, this type of trans-
portation cost is not intuitive. But in the real world, transportation costs depend on
the spatial structure. If a city appears at a location, the transportation costs in the
vicinity are bound to change.
APPENDIX C. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. First, we prove R(0) ￿ ￿1 = R(￿) ￿ ￿2 = 0. The landlord
at 0 has a net income R(0) ￿ ￿1 ￿ 0 since 0 2 B. Suppose R(0) ￿ ￿1 = ￿ > 0. For




G(0)￿pA(0)1￿￿ and it is continuous in r since pM (ck;r) is continuous in r for
all ck. So for any ￿ > 0 there is an ￿ > 0 small enough such that
￿ ￿pA (0 ￿ ￿) ￿ pA (0)
￿ ￿ <
￿=2 and cA jw(0 ￿ ￿) ￿ w(0)j < ￿=2. By free-entry, R(r) = pA (r) ￿ cAw(r). Thus,
R(0 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿1 =
￿




pA (0) ￿ cAw(0)
￿
+ R(0) ￿ ￿1
=
￿
pA (0 ￿ ￿) ￿ pA (0)
￿
￿ cA [w(0 ￿ ￿) ￿ w(0)] + ￿ > 0
But 0 ￿ ￿ = 2 B; this is a contradiction. The same argument applies to ￿.
Next, we show R(r) ￿ ￿1 < 0 for all r 2 (￿1;0). Note that R(r) = pA (r) ￿
cAw(0)G(r)￿pA(r)1￿￿













































drtM (ck;r) < 0;
and d
drpA (r) = pA (c1) d
drtA (r;c1)
￿1 > 0. This follows from d
drtM (ck;r) < 0 and
d
drtA (r;c1) < 0 since r < ck for all k. So, d
drO(r) < 0 for r 2 (￿1;0). Thus,
d
drR(r) > 0 and we have R(r) ￿ ￿1 < 0 for r 2 (￿1;0).
25For r 2 (￿;1), d
drtM (ck;r) > 0 and d
drtA (r;cK) > 0, since r > ck for all k. Thus,
d
drG(r) > 0, d
drpA (r) < 0, and d
drO(r) > 0. Therefore, d
drR(r) < 0 and R(r)￿￿2 < 0
for r 2 (￿;1).
Proof of Lemma 2. Summing up the budget constraint of each consumer over





































h=1 wh (Nh + lh) = 0:
















1 ￿ AL (r) ￿ cAAW (r)
￿
dr:





AW (ch)(Nh + lh) ￿ tA (r;ch)
￿1 ￿
































h=1 tM (ck;ch)mW (ck;ch)(Nh + lh)
#
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A (ch)fh+K = 0:
26Proof of Theorem 1. Before proving Theorem 1, we present a few lemmas. Let
M be a boundariless C1-manifold of dimension m, (a;b) be an open interval in <,
and M ￿ < be endowed with the product topology. Let int denote interior taken in
M. We have the following results.
Lemma 4. (Milnor 1965, Section 2, Lemma 3) If g : M ! < is a C1-map with
0 as a regular value, then the set fx 2 Mjg (x) ￿ 0g is a C1-manifold of dimension
m with g￿1 (0) as its boundary.
Lemma 5. Suppose g : M ￿ < ! < is continuous and there is ￿ ￿ > 0 such that
g (x;y) > 0 for all (x;y) 2 [M ￿ (a;a +￿ ￿)][[M ￿ (b ￿￿ ￿;b)]. Let U = fx 2 Mjg (x;y) ￿ 0;8y 2 (a;b)g
and V = fx 2 Mjg (x;y) > 0;8y 2 (a;b)g. Then (i) U is closed and V is open in
M. (ii) If g is C1 with 0 as a regular value, then intU = V .
Proof. (i) Note that U = fx 2 Mjg (x;y) ￿ 0;8y 2 [a +￿ ￿=2;b ￿￿ ￿=2]g and
V = fx 2 Mjg (x;y) > 0;8y 2 [a +￿ ￿=2;b ￿￿ ￿=2]g. Let h(x) = miny2[a+￿ ￿=2;b￿￿ ￿=2] g (x;y).
h(x) is continuous by the Maximum Theorem since we minimize a continuous func-
tion g (x;y) over y, constrained by a correspondence ￿(x) = [a +￿ ￿=2;b ￿￿ ￿=2] that
is compact valued and continuous. Note that U = fx 2 Mjh(x) ￿ 0g and V =
fx 2 Mjh(x) > 0g. Thus, U is closed and V is open by the continuity of h.
(ii) Obviously, V ￿ U and V is open, so V ￿ IntU. We show that IntU ￿
V . Take a point ^ x 2 IntU. There is an open neighborhood N^ x ￿ M such that
x 2 U for all x 2 N^ x. This means for all (x;y) 2 N^ x ￿ (a;b), g (x;y) ￿ 0 and
N^ x ￿ (a;b) ￿ O = f(x;y) 2 M ￿ (a;b)jg (x;y) ￿ 0g. We claim g (^ x;y) > 0 for all
y 2 (a;b). Suppose not; there is ￿ y 2 (a;b) such that g (^ x; ￿ y) = 0. By Lemma
4, O is an m + 1 dimensional Cr-manifold with boundary g￿1 (0). And (^ x; ￿ y) 2
g￿1 (0). Since (^ x; ￿ y) is on the boundary of O, any open set S ￿ M ￿ (a;b) such that
(^ x; ￿ y) 2 S contains both the inside and the outside of O. So, S \ ~ O 6= ; ( ~ O is the
complement of O). Since N^ x￿(￿ y ￿ ￿; ￿ y + ￿) is an open set in M ￿(a;b) that contains















++. Label the left-hand side
27functions in (14) f1;:::;fK. Because of Walras￿law, we take the last equation in (15)
as redundant and label the left-hand side of the rest fK+1;:::;f2K￿1. Label those
in (16) f2K;:::;f3K￿1, in (17) f3K, and in (18) f3K+1. Let f = (f1;:::;f3K+1); the
equations above constitute the system f (x;￿) = 0 where f : <4K
++ ￿ ￿ ! <3K+1.
For the analysis, we add an extra dimension < to the domain of f, which does not
a⁄ect its values. Let ￿ f (x;r;￿) = f (x;￿) with the dummy argument r 2 < where
￿ f : <4K
++ ￿ < ￿ ￿ ! <3K+1. Let Fk = ￿ fk for k 2 f1;:::;3K + 1g, Fk+3K+1 = ￿ Qk
for k 2 f1;:::;Kg, and F4K+2 = ￿ R. We have F =




++ ￿ < ￿ ￿ ! <4K+2. Next, we show that ￿ is a regular parameterization; i.e.,







k=1 and D￿ ￿ R are always lineally independent at an equilibrium.
Lemma 6. D￿F has rank 4K + 2 at every equilibrium x for all r 2 (￿￿ z; ￿ z) for
all ￿ 2 ￿.
Proof. (i) Di⁄erentiate F partially with respect to ￿. @￿k causes changes only
in the output levels of ￿rms in city ck. The other endogenous variables do not




(1￿￿)cM 6= 0 for all
k 2 f1;:::;Kg,
@Fh
@￿k = 0 for all h 6= k, k;h 2 f1;:::;Kg, and also
@Fh
@￿k = 0 for all
h 2 fK + 1;:::;3K + 1;4K + 2g, k 2 f1;:::;Kg. This means D￿F(1;:::;K) is always a
K ￿ K diagonal matrix with nonzero elements.
(ii) Di⁄erentiate with respect to l. This does not a⁄ect prices, so DlF(2K;:::;3K+1;4K+2) =
0. Moreover, DlF(K+1;:::;2K￿1) is a (K ￿ 1)￿(K ￿ 1) diagonal matrix with nonzero ele-
ments, since
@Fh
@lk = ￿AW (ck) 6= 0 in equilibrium for all h = k+K, k 2 f1;:::;K ￿ 1g,
and also
@Fh
@lk = 0 for all h 6= k + K, h 2 fK + 1;:::;2K ￿ 1g, k 2 f1;:::;K ￿ 1g.
(iii) Di⁄erentiate with respect to ￿. Note that all wk are held ￿xed, so ￿ does





k 6= 0 in equilibrium for all h = k + 2K ￿ 1,
k 2 f1;:::;Kg, and also
@Fh
@￿k = 0 for all h 6= k + 2K ￿ 1, h 2 f2K;:::;3K ￿ 1g,
k 2 f1;:::;Kg. Moreover, D￿F(1;:::;2K￿1;3K;3K+1;4K+2) = 0.




@￿2 = ￿1. None of the other functions changes.





0 for all h = k + 3K + 1, k 2 f1;:::;Kg, and also
@Fh
@￿k = 0 for all h 6= k + 3K + 1,
h 2 f3K + 2;:::;4K + 1g, k 2 f1;:::;Kg. Moreover, DeF(1;:::;3K+1;4K+2) = 0.
(iv) Di⁄erentiate with respect to ￿. ￿ a⁄ects ￿ R only and
@F4K+2
@￿ = ￿1. None of
28the other functions change.
Thus, D￿F =
0
B B B B
B B B B B B
B
@
D￿F(1;:::;K) A2 0 0 0 0 0
0 DlF(K+1;:::;2K￿1) 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 D￿F(2K;:::;3K￿1) 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 D￿1F3K 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 D￿2F3K+1 0 0
A1 A3 A4 0 0 DeF(3K+2;:::;4K+1) 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 D￿F4K+2
1
C C C C




D￿F always has rank 4K + 2 at an equilibrium since A1 to A4 can be eliminated by
elementary operations and what remains is a diagonal matrix with nonzero elements.
Next, we break down the equilibrium conditions into the following sets; the equilib-
rium set is the intersection of these sets. Let E (￿) =
￿
x 2 <4K
++jf (x;￿) = 0
￿
denote





++jc1 < ::: < cK < ￿; N ￿
K X
k=1




0 (￿) = E (￿) \ H1 (￿);
















++j ￿ R(x;r;￿) ￿ 0;8r 2 (0;￿)
￿
:
Then, E￿ (￿) = \K
k=1H2;k (￿) \ H3 (￿) is the K-equilibrium set for parameter value ￿.
The proof relies much on the following version of the Transversality Theorem (see
Guillemin and Pollack 1974, p. 68, and Mas-Colell 1985, p. 320). A few de￿nitions
are in order. For a Cr map f : M ! N between manifolds, y 2 N is a regular value
if Df (x) has full rank for all x 2 f￿1 (y); and y 2 N is a critical value if not.
Transversality Theorem: Suppose that f : X￿S ! <m is a Cr map where
X;S are Cr boundariless manifolds with r > maxf0;dim(X) ￿ mg; let fs (x) =
f (x;s), fs : X ! <m. If y 2 <m is a regular value for f, then except for s in a set
of measure zero in S, y is a regular value for fs.
29By Lemma 6, D￿f has full rank 3K +1 at every equilibrium for all ￿ 2 ￿; hence,
D(x;￿)f = (Dxf;D￿f) has full rank whenever f (x;￿) = 0. So, 0 is a regular value of
f (x;￿). Obviously, f is C1. The Transversality Theorem says that except for ￿ in
a set of measure zero, f￿ (x) = f (x;￿), where f￿ : <4K
++ ! <3K+1, has 0 as a regular
value. The preimage of a regular value of f￿ is a C1-manifold of dimension K ￿ 1
(see Guillemin and Pollack 1974, p. 28; see also the Implicit Function Theorem in
Mas-Colell 1985, p. 38). Therefore, E (￿) = f
￿1
￿ (0) is generically a C1-manifold of
dimension K ￿ 1. Moreover, H1 (￿) is an open subset of <4K
++ and a C1-manifold
of dimension 4K (codimension zero). It is transversal to E (￿) in <4K
++, which has
codimension 3K +1 in <4K
++. So, E0 (￿) = E (￿)\H1 (￿) is generically a C1-manifold
of codimension 3K + 1 in <4K
++; this means it has dimension K ￿ 1. The next lemma
shows that this manifold is bounded, which will be useful later.
Lemma 7. E0 (￿) is bounded in <4K.







by H1 (￿). We show that fwkg
K






























w0 > 0, limwk!1
wk
w0 > 0, and these limits are bounded. This implies
if one of fwkg
K
k=0 is unbounded, then all of them are unbounded. If all wages are





cA is bounded, this violates (15). Therefore, E0 (￿) is bounded in <4K.
We de￿ne the following functions for a given ￿ by restricting the domains of
￿ Qk (:;￿) and ￿ R(:;￿) to be E0 (￿) ￿ <. Let ￿ Q￿k
￿ : E0 (￿) ￿ < ! < be such that
￿ Q￿k
￿ (x;r) = ￿ Qk (x;r;￿) for all (x;r;￿) 2 E0 (￿) ￿ < ￿ ￿. Let ￿ R￿
￿ : E0 (￿) ￿ < ! < be
such that ￿ R￿




0 (￿)j ￿ Q
￿k








0 (￿)j ￿ R
￿
￿ (x;r) ￿ 0;8r 2 (0;￿)
￿
:
30Next, we present an equivalent condition to D(x;r) ￿ Q￿k
￿ (x;r) (respectively D(x;r) ￿ R￿
￿ (x;r))




Lemma 8. Given (x;r;￿) such that D(x;r) ￿ f (x;r;￿) has full rank, (i) D(x;r) ￿ Q￿k
￿ (x;r)
has full rank if and only if D(x;r) ￿ Qk (x;r;￿) and
￿
D(x;r) ￿ fk (x;r;￿)
￿3K+1
k=1 are lin-
early independent; (ii) D(x;r) ￿ R￿
￿ (x;r) has full rank if and only if D(x;r) ￿ R(x;r;￿) and
￿
D(x;r) ￿ fk (x;r;￿)
￿3K+1
k=1 are linearly independent.
Proof. (i) Let Tx (M) denote the tangent space of a manifold M at x 2 M.
D(x;r) ￿ Q￿k
￿ (x;r) maps from T(x;r) (E0 (￿) ￿ <) to <. It has full rank if its range equals
<. Therefore, we need D(x;r) ￿ Qk not to carry all elements in T(x;r) (E0 (￿) ￿ <) to zero.
That is, there is u 2 T(x;r) (E0 (￿) ￿ <) such that D(x;y) ￿ Qk (x;r;￿)u 6= 0. This is
true if and only if D(x;y) ￿ Qk (x;r;￿) does not belong to the orthogonal complement of
T(x;r) (E0 (￿) ￿ <). Since T(x;r) (E0 (￿) ￿ <) =
￿
u 2 <4K
++ ￿ <jD(x;r) ￿ f (x;r;￿)u = 0
￿
,
its orthogonal complement is the linear space spanned by
￿
D(x;r) ￿ fk (x;r;￿)
￿3K+1
k=1 .
This means D(x;y) ￿ Qk (x;r;￿) is linearly independent of
￿
D(x;r) ￿ fk (x;r;￿)
￿3K+1
k=1 . (ii)
The argument for D(x;r) ￿ R￿
￿ (x;r) is exactly the same.
Lemma 9. For almost all ￿ 2 ￿, ￿ Q￿k
￿ (x;r) and ￿ R￿
￿ (x;r) have 0 as a regular
value.
Proof. Let Gk =
￿ ￿ f1;:::; ￿ f3K+1; ￿ Qk￿
: <4K
++￿<￿￿ ! <3K+2. D￿Gk always has full




has full rank whenever Gk (x;r;￿) = 0, and 0 is a regu-
lar value of Gk (x;r;￿). By the Transversality Theorem, Gk
￿ : <4K
++￿< ! <3K+2, where
Gk
￿ (x;r) = Gk (x;r;￿), has 0 as a regular value except for ￿ in a set of measure zero.
This means for almost all ￿ 2 ￿, for all (x;r) such that Gk
￿ (x;r) = 0, D(x;r)Gk (x;r)
has full rank, and this means D(x;r) ￿ Qk (x;r;￿) and
￿
D(x;r) ￿ fk (x;r;￿)
￿3K+1
k=1 are linearly
independent. Note that Gk
￿ (x;r) = 0 if and only if x 2 E0 (￿) and ￿ Qk (x;r;￿) = 0. So,
by Lemma 8, D(x;r) ￿ Q￿k
￿ (x;r) has full rank whenever ￿ Q￿k
￿ (x;r) = 0 for almost all ￿.
Letting GR =
￿ ￿ f1;:::; ￿ f3K+1; ￿ R
￿
, the argument for ￿ R￿
￿ (x;r) follows in the same way.
Next, we proceed to show that the equilibrium set E￿ (￿) has a K ￿1 dimensional






0 (￿)j ￿ Q
￿k










0 (￿)j ￿ R
￿
￿ (x;r) > 0;8r 2 (0;￿)
￿
:
Lemma 10. For almost all ￿ 2 ￿, (i) H0
2;k (￿) and H0
3 (￿) are open subsets of
E0 (￿); (ii) in E0 (￿), intH2;k (￿) = H0
2;k (￿) for all k 2 f1;:::;Kg and intH3 (￿) =
H0
3 (￿).
Proof. We deal with H3 (￿) and H0
3 (￿) ￿rst. ￿ R￿
￿ is C1 and Lemma 9 ensures that
0 is a regular value of ￿ R￿
￿ for almost all ￿ 2 ￿. Take a regular ￿ 2 ￿. In order to apply
Lemma 5, we need to ￿nd a suitable￿ ￿ for each ￿. Note that for all r 2 [0;￿], @
@r ￿ R￿
￿ (x;r)







￿ is bounded. Condition (17) requires 1 ￿ cAw0 ￿ ￿1 = 0. This
and the fact that ￿1 > ￿ imply that ￿ R￿
￿ (x;0) = 1￿cAw0￿￿ = ￿1￿￿ > 0, a constant,
for all x 2 E0 (￿). So, there is an ￿0 > 0 such that ￿ R￿
￿ (x;r) > 0 for all r 2 (0;￿0) for all
x 2 E0 (￿). In the same fashion by (18), ￿ R￿
￿ (x;￿) = pA (￿)￿cAw(￿)￿￿ = ￿2￿￿ > 0
for all x 2 E0 (￿). So there is an ￿￿ > 0 such that ￿ R￿
￿ (x;r) > 0 for all r 2 (￿ ￿ ￿￿;￿)
for all x 2 E0 (￿). Take ￿ ￿R = minf￿0;￿￿g. Lemma 5 applies with R￿
￿ as g, E0 (￿) as M,
and (0;￿) as (a;b). Therefore, H0
3 (￿) is an open set in E0 (￿), and intH3 (￿) = H0
3 (￿).
Next, we deal with H2;k (￿) and H0
2;k (￿). For any k 2 f1;:::Kg, ￿ Q￿k
￿ is C1 and
Lemma 9 ensures that 0 is a regular value of ￿ Q￿k
￿ for almost all ￿ 2 ￿. Take a regular





is bounded for all r 2 (￿￿ z; ￿ z). We can choose ￿ z such that ￿ Q￿k
￿ (x;￿￿ z) = ￿ Q￿k
￿ (x; ￿ z) =
￿ < 0 for all x 2 E0 (￿). So there are ￿0;￿00 > 0 such that ￿ Q￿k
￿ (x;r) < 0 for all r 2
(￿￿ z;￿0)[(￿00; ￿ z) for all x 2 E0 (￿). Also, by condition (14), ￿ Q￿k
￿ (x;ch) = ￿
￿ek
(1￿￿)cM < 0
for all h 2 f1;:::;Kg. So, for all h 2 f1;:::;Kg, there is ￿h such that ￿ Q￿k
￿ (x;ch) < 0 for
all r 2 (ch ￿ ￿h;ch) [ (ch;ch + ￿h) for all x 2 E0 (￿). Take ￿ ￿k = minf￿0;￿00;￿1;:::;￿Kg.
Although we work with r 2 (￿￿ z; ￿ z)n[K
k=1 fckg instead of one interval, the argument
in Lemma 5 applies with ￿ ￿ Q￿k
￿ (x;ch) as g, E0 (￿) as M, and (￿￿ z; ￿ z)n [K
k=1 fckg as
(a;b). So, H0
2;k (￿) is an open subset of E0 (￿) and intH2;k (￿) = H0
2;k (￿).
By Lemma 10, H0
2;k (￿) and H0
3 (￿) are open subsets of E0 (￿) and hence C1-
manifolds of dimension K￿1 for almost all ￿ 2 ￿. Each of them has zero codimension







3 (￿) denote their intersection. Since these
32manifolds are transversal to each other in E0 (￿), their intersection E0 (￿) is a C1
manifold in E0 (￿) of codimension equal to the sum of the codimension of all, which is
zero. So, for almost all ￿ 2 ￿, E0 (￿) is a C1-manifold of dimension K￿1. Therefore,

















So, E￿ (￿) has E0 (￿), a K ￿ 1 dimensional C1-manifold, as its interior (taken in
E0 (￿)).
Proof of Corollary 1. First, we restrict the model to be symmetric. Some of the
parameters and equations are redundant; they will be eliminated later. Note that the
rent conditions (17) and (18) mean R(0) ￿ ￿1 = 0 and R(￿) ￿ ￿2 = 0 respectively.
One of them is redundant and is eliminated since ￿1 = ￿2 and symmetry implies
R(0) = R(￿).
When K is even, symmetry reduces the numbers of free variables ck and Nk to
K=2 respectively, the number of variables bk to (K=2) ￿ 1 (since bK=2 = ￿=2 is ￿xed
at the middle), and the number of variables wk (this includes w0) to (K=2) + 1. The
number of equations in each of (16), (14), and (15) is reduced to K=2. Walras￿law
renders one equation redundant. Adding one equation for the rent, the total number
of independent equations is 3K=2. 2K variables and 3K=2 equations generate a C1
solution manifold of generic dimension K=2. Note that inequalities (19), (21), and (20)
do not a⁄ect generic dimension (their numbers are reduced accordingly). Eliminate
parameters in ￿ if their associating equalities or inequalities are eliminated. Then,
the remaining parameters constitute a regular parameterization for the symmetric
economy. As argued in the proof of Theorem 1, for almost all parameter values, the
equilibrium set has the solution manifold for (16), (17), (18), (14), and (15) as its
interior.
When K is odd, the numbers of free variables ck and bk are both (K ￿ 1)=2
(note that c(K+1)=2 = ￿=2) and those of variables Nk and wk are (K + 1)=2 and
((K + 1)=2) + 1 respectively. Each of (16), (14), and (15) has (K + 1)=2 equations,
and Walras￿law renders one redundant. Adding one equation for the rent, the total
number of independent equations is 3(K + 1)=2. 2K + 1 variables and (3K + 1)=2
equations generate a C1 solution manifold of dimension (K ￿ 1)=2. The conclusion
is reached in the same way as above.
33APPENDIX D. Approximating the Equilibrium Set
Sets H2;k and H3 involve minimization, which does not preserve smoothness. We
resort to their approximations in order to further utilize the di⁄erentiable approach.
Theorem 2 illustrates how far the equilibrium set extends beyond its interior.
Theorem 2. For almost all ￿ 2 ￿, the set of K-equilibria of an economy is
approximately contained in the closure of its interior.
Proof. De￿ne
h
R (x;￿) = min
r2[￿ ￿R=2;￿￿￿ ￿R=2]
￿ R(x;r;￿)
where hR (x;￿) : <4K ￿￿ ! < (￿ ￿R is de￿ned in the proof of Lemma 10). Restricting
its domain to E0 (￿) for a given ￿, we have
h
R






￿ (x) : E0 (￿) ! <. De￿ne
h
k (x;￿) = min




where hk (x;￿) : <4K ￿ ￿ ! < (￿ ￿k is de￿ned in the proof of Lemma 10). Restricting
its domain to E0 (￿) for a given ￿, we have
h
k
￿ (x) = min






￿ (x) : E0 (￿) ! <. Thus,
H2;k (￿) =
￿
x 2 E0 (￿)jhk





x 2 E0 (￿)jhR
￿ (x) ￿ 0
￿
:
Functions hR and hk are continuous by the Maximum Theorem since we minimize
continuous functions over constraint correspondences that are compact-valued and
continuous. They are not, however, necessarily smooth. We analyze their smooth
approximations in order to further study the equilibrium set. We want to use C1
approximations of hR and hk that preserve their ￿rst order derivatives with respect
to (e;￿).
34First, note that D(e;￿)hR (x;￿) = D(e;￿) ￿ R(x;r;￿) = (0;:::;0;￿1)
T for all (x;￿) since
D(e;￿) ￿ R(x;r;￿) is constant over r. Let hR ￿
x;￿￿(e;￿);0;:::;0
￿
denote the function ob-




C1 function ^ hR ￿
x;￿￿(e;￿);0;:::;0
￿
(Hirsch￿ s theorem, see Appendix B). Then function
^ hR (x;￿) = ^ hR ￿
x;￿￿(e;￿);0;:::;0
￿








that for all k, Dekhk (x;￿) = ￿ @
@ek
￿ Qk (x;r;￿) =
￿
(1￿￿)cM and D(e￿k;￿)hk (x;￿) =
￿D(e￿k;￿) ￿ Qk (x;r;￿) = 0 (because D(e;￿) ￿ Qk (x;r;￿) is constant over r). Thus function





(1￿￿)cMek is a C1 approximation of hk (x;￿). We
have C1 maps ^ hR and ^ hk such that D(e;￿)^ hR (x;￿) = D(e;￿)hR (x;￿) and D(e;￿)^ hk (x;￿) =
D(e;￿)hk (x;￿).
For a given ￿, de￿ne maps ^ hR
￿ : E0 (￿) ! < and ^ hk
￿ : E0 (￿) ! < by restricting
the domains of ^ hR and ^ hk to be E0 (￿) respectively. That is, ^ hR
￿ (x) = ^ hR (x;￿) and
^ hk
￿ (x) = ^ hk (x;￿) for all (x;￿) 2 E0 (￿) ￿ ￿. Let
^ H2;k (￿) =
n
x 2 E0 (￿)j^ hk




^ H3 (￿) =
n
x 2 E0 (￿)j^ hR






x 2 E0 (￿)j^ hk







x 2 E0 (￿)j^ hR
￿ (x) > 0;8r 2 (0;￿)
o
:
These sets are the approximations of H2;k (￿), H3 (￿), H0
2;k (￿) and H0
3 (￿) respec-
tively, that we will use. Thus
￿
\K
k=1 ^ H2;k (￿)
￿







3 (￿) approximates E0 (￿). Lemmas D1 and D2 imply that E￿ (￿)




k=1 ^ H2;k (￿)
￿










denotes closure taken in <4K. Let cl0 denote closure taken in E0 (￿).
Lemma 11. For almost all ￿ 2 ￿, cl0 ^ H0
2;k (￿) = ^ H2;k (￿) for all k 2 f1;::Kg and
cl0 ^ H0
3 (￿) = ^ H3 (￿).
Proof. Take ^ H0
3 (￿) and ^ H3 (￿) for example. cl0 ^ H0
3 (￿) ￿ ^ H3 (￿) is implied by
Lemma 10, we show ^ H3 (￿) ￿ cl0 ^ H0
3 (￿) for almost all ￿ 2 ￿. Take a ￿ 2 ￿ such that
^ H3 (￿)ncl0 ^ H0
3 (￿) 6= ;. Note that x 2 ^ H3 (￿) if and only if ^ hR
￿ (x) ￿ 0, and x 2 ^ H0
3 (￿)
if and only if ^ hR
￿ (x) > 0. Therefore, for all x 2 ^ H3 (￿)ncl0 ^ H0
3 (￿), we have ^ hR
￿ (x) = 0
35and there is a neighborhood N ￿ E (￿) around x such that ^ hR
￿ (x0) ￿ 0 for all x0 2 N.
So, x is a local maximum of ^ hR
￿ (x) in E0 (￿) and Dx^ hR
￿ (x) = 0. This means 0 is a
critical value of ^ hR
￿ .
Next, we show that for almost all ￿ 2 ￿, 0 is a regular value of Dx^ hR
￿ and
hence ^ H3 (￿)ncl0 ^ H0
3 (￿) = ;. Note that Dx^ hR
￿ maps from Tx (E0 (￿)) to <. There-
fore, it has full rank if Dx^ hR (x;￿) and fDxfk (x;￿)g
3K+1
k=1 are linearly independent
(as argued in Lemma 8). Since D(e;￿)^ hR (x;￿) = D(e;￿) ￿ R(x;r;￿), D￿^ hR (x;￿) and
fD￿fk (x;￿)g
3K+1
k=1 are always linearly independent (Lemma 6). Therefore, for al-
most all ￿ 2 ￿, Dx^ hR (x;￿) and fDxfk (x;￿)g
3K+1
k=1 are linearly independent whenever
x 2 E0 (￿) and D(e;￿)^ hR (x;￿) = 0 (by the Transversality Theorem as argued in Lemma
9). This means 0 is a regular value of Dx^ hR
￿ for almost all ￿. Following the same
argument and noting that D(e;￿)^ hk
￿ (x) = D(e;￿)^ hk (x;￿) = D(e;￿) ￿ Qk (x;r;￿) for all k,
we can show ^ H2:k (￿) ￿ cl0 ^ H0
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linearly independent whenever ^ HS

















. Take any ￿ x 2 \K
k=1cl0 ^ H0
2;k (￿) \ cl0 ^ H0
3 (￿). If ￿ x be-
longs to the interior of all cl0 ^ H0
2;k and cl0 ^ H0
3 then it belongs to the closure of the
intersection. Suppose ￿ x belongs to the boundary of some sets and the interior of the
others. That is, there is S0 ￿ S such that ^ hi
￿ (￿ x) = 0 for i 2 S0 and ^ hi
￿ (￿ x) > 0 for





i2S0 are linearly independent (note that ^ HS0
￿ (￿ x) = 0),
there exists a vector u 2 Tx (E0 (￿)) such that Dx^ hi
￿ (x)u > 0 for all i 2 S0. (There
exists a solution to Dx ^ HS0
￿ (x)u >> 0 because Dx ^ HS0
￿ (x) has full rank). Let u(￿)
denote the projection of ￿ x + ￿u onto E0 (￿). For su¢ ciently small ￿ > 0 , we have
^ hi
￿ (u(￿)) > 0 for all i 2 S0 and ^ hi
￿ (u(￿)) > 0 for all i 2 SnS0 by continuity. This















. D￿ ^ HS (x;￿) always has full rank (by Lemma 6 and that








are linearly independent whenever x 2







are linearly independent whenever ^ HS
￿ (x) = 0
except for ￿ in a set of measure zero.
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